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A CASE OF FORCED EQUITY: 
OBTAINING SPOUSAL AND 
CHILD SUPPORT FROM A 
MEMBER OF THE 
ARMED FORCES 
Georgetta Beck* 
When called upon to represent dependents in a spousal or 
child support proceeding, the practitioner is confronted with a 
vast array of legal and emotional issues. When the obligorl is a 
member of the Armed Forces,2 additional elements are added to 
the picture: Federal statutes exist to protect hisS rights,· military 
regulations govern his accessibility,G and the court, at times, dis-
plays a protective attitude toward him.6 
* Third year student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. The term "obligor" is used throughout this Comment to refer to a service mem-
ber who is legally obligated to support his or her dependents, regardless of whether pur-
suant to judicial decree. 
2. For purposes of this Comment, the terms "Armed Forces" and "military" refer to 
the Army, Navy, and Air Force. 
3. Masculine pronouns shall be used when referring to a member of the Armed 
Forces where gender-neutral terms are unduly cumbersome. This is done for both sim-
plicity and general accuracy because in most cases dependents seek support from a male 
member of the military. The masculine pronoun is not used to perpetuate cultural ste-
reotypes, but merely in recognition of statistical reality. Women constitute only about 
8% of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. NEWSWEEK, Feb. 18, 1980, at 35. 
4. See The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501-591 
(1976) [hereinafter cited as SSCRA]. 
5. See, e.g., Army Regs. No. 27-40 (15 June 1973), which sets forth Army policy on 
personally serving a service member with process on base; see also Army Regs. No. 630-5 
(18 March 1977), concerning Army policy on granting leavetime to a service member-a 
regulation which may circumscribe the ability to make court appearances. These regula-
tions are discussed at notes 58-73 and 151-154 infra and accompanying text. 
Army regulations are not readily available to the general public. The only library in 
San Francisco with a complete set of regulations was located at the Presidio Army Base. 
Furthermore, the author was initially advised by a Presidio Staff Sergeant that civilian 
access to the library would be permitted only if the stated purpose was not adverse to 
the interests of the Army. Contact the Legal Assistance Office of the appropriate base for 
more information on access to Army regulations. 
6. See, e.g., Kerrin v. Kerrin, 97 Cal. App. 2d 913, 218 P.2d 1004 (1950) (trial court 
found defendant service member forever relieved of child and spousal support liability to 
the extent it is greater than his military allotment, even though the property settlement 
885 
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Practitioners generally experience little difference between 
the common action for support and one against a service mem-
ber stationed in the United States. In one respect, obtaining 
support from military personnel may be facilitated by military 
channels which can be used as an alternative to court proceed-
ings.'1 Nevertheless, the recalcitrant military obligor may present 
particular problems to the practitioner seeking to obtain support 
through the courts.8 
This Comment presents an overview of procedures which 
the practitioner may employ to obtain spousal and child support 
from a service member stationed in the United States, identifies 
problems which may arise in these efforts, and discusses strate-
gies to overcome those obstacles. The first section explains the 
military procedure for obtaining support and discusses the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of that approach.9 This Comment 
will focus on Army procedure and regulations; other branches of 
the Armed Forces have a similar, but not identical, approach to 
the pervasive problem of nonsupport.10 
agreement required a larger amount); Semler v. Oertwig, 234 Iowa 233, 238, 12 N.W.2d 
265, 270 (1943) (in reversing the trial court's denial of a stay under the SSCRA, the 
appellate court stated, "[D]oubtful cases should be resolved in favor of the service 
man."); McGlynn v. McGlynn, 178 Misc. 530, 531, 35 N.Y.S.2d 6, 7 (1942) (upon staying 
an order that a man pay alimony to his former wife so long as he remained in the mili-
tary, the court stated, "At all hazards every inhibition must be deferred so that he is 
physically, mentally and spiritually free to devote himself to the greatest task ever to 
confront him and his country."). 
7. See Army Regs. No. 608-99 (15 Nov. 1978) for Army procedures regarding com-
plaints of nonsupport by dependents of Army personnel; for Navy procedures, see 32 
C.F.R. § 715 (1980); for Air Force procedures, see 32 C.F.R. § 846 (1980). 
8. For example, the service member may fail to respond to the support action, forc-
ing the practitioner to comply with cumbersome protective statutory provisions before a 
default judgment may be obtained. Further, military orders may make court appearances 
an impracticality. See, e.g., Bond v. Bond, 547 S.W.2d 43 (TeL Civ. App. 1977). These 
problems, and others, shall be addressed throughout this Comment. 
9. See notes 23-53 infra and accompanying text. 
10. For example, the Army designates a minimum dollar amount to be used for sup-
port of the member's dependents. The amount varies with the service member's rank, 
not with the number of dependents. Army Regs. No. 608-99, 11 2-2(c) (15 Nov_ 1978), and 
37 U.S.C. § 1009 (Supp. m 1979). The Navy, on the other hand, designates a percentage 
of the member's gross pay to be used for support where there is no court order fixing the 
amount and the parties are unable to otherwise agree. The percentage is based upon the 
relationship and number of dependents. 32 C.F.R. § 715.16 (1980). The Air Force merely 
requires its members to provide support "bearing a reasonable relation to the needs of 
the spouse and children." 32 C.F.R. § 846.4(a) (1980). 
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The second section discusses problems peculiar to obtaining 
a support order against the service member through state court. 
This includes perfecting personal service on Army personnel sta-
tioned on federal territory,11 and the applicability of the 
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act (SSCRA).12 The SSCRA 
was enacted to protect service members who, because of military 
service, are unable to protect their rights. IS Its stay and default 
judgment provisions can create complications for the practi-
tioner.14 The requirements of those provisions1G and the factors 
which the courts consider relevant in denying or granting relief 
thereunder are discussed.16 
The last section of this Comment focuses upon enforcement 
of the state court orderl'1-whether by obtaining the service 
member's voluntary compliance, possibly with the aid of mili-
tary channels,18 or by garnishment.19 SSCRA problems in the 
area of support enforcement will also be addressed.20 In contrast 
to the difficulties which can arise in obtaining a support judg-
ment, enforcement can usually be accomplished with relative 
ease. 
I. THE MILITARY PROCEDURE TO OBTAIN SUPPORT 
Concerned that their members may discredit the service by 
11. See notes 58-73 infra and accompanying text. 
12. 50 u.s.c. app. §§ 501-591 (1976). See notes 74-167 infra and accompanying text. 
13. For example, a service member engaged in combat is clearly incapable of partici-
pating in a lawsuit. See generally Skilton, The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 
1940 and the Amendments of 1942, 91 U. PA. L. REV. 177 (1942). 
14. For example, the SSCRA permits a service member to stay a court proceeding 
when the ability to defend is materially affected because of military service. 50 U.S.C. 
app. § 521 (1976). Under the SSCRA, a default judgment cannot be entered against a 
service member unless an attorney is appointed to represent his interests. ld. § 520 
(1976). 
15. For the discussion of the stay provision, see notes 86-97 infra and accompanying 
text. For the default provision discussion, see notes 98-123 infra and accompanying text. 
16. See notes 124-167 infra and accompanying text. 
17. See notes 168-186 infra and accompanying text. 
18. See, e.g., Army Regs. No. 608-99, 11 2-4(c) (15 Nov. 1978), requiring service mem-
ber compliance with court orders. See notes 171-175 infra and accompanying text. 
19. The federal garnishment statute is found at 42 U.S.C. § 659 (Supp. III 1979). 
See notes 176-181 infra and accompanying text. 
20. The SSCRA permits the service member to stay the enforcement of a judgment 
under certain circumstances. 50 U.S.C. app. § 523 (1976). See notes 182-186 infra and 
accompanying text. 
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neglecting family obligations,21 the Armed Forces ~xpressly re-
quire members to support their dependents.22 To further this 
policy, each branch has established internal procedures with 
which to handle nonsupport problems.2s Army regulations pro-
vide that the service member's superiors can attempt to per-
suade the member to pay support and impose certain sanc-
tions.24 Absent a court order of garnishment, however, his 
superiors cannot compel the service member to pay support.25 
The practitioner should consider military channels before 
attempting to obtain a court order of support. If successful, a 
lengthy and expensive court process is avoided altogether and 
the animosity of an adversary proceeding minimized. In addi-
tion, internal procedures may be an adequate temporary mea-
sure until a support judgment can be obtained. Use of the mili-
tary approach, however, with the possible imposition of 
sanctions, may not be appropriate in every situation.28 The prac-
titioner needs to weigh the likelihood of success as well as the 
cooperativeness and financial circumstances of the parties before 
pursuing this procedure. 
The service member's commanding officer is authorized by 
the Army to use influence over the member to see that he abides 
by the Army policy on support of dependents.27 The practitioner 
21. "The Naval Service will not be a haven or refuge for personnel who disregard or 
evade their obligations to their families. All members of the Naval Service are expected 
to conduct their personal affairs satisfactorily." 32 C:F.R. § 715.11(c) (1980); "Army 
members must conduct their personal affairs satisfactorily." Army Regs. No. 608-99, n 1-
3(a) (15 Nov. 1978). 
22. The Army requires its members to provide "adequate and continuous support 
for all primary legal dependents (spouse and children-to include stepchildren, adopted 
children or illegitimate children dependent on the member ... )" as well as to comply 
with all separation agreements and court orders. ld. nn (1), (2). 
23. See note 7 supra. The Army's goal in support matters is to find a solution ac-
ceptable both to the dependents and the particular service member involved. Army Regs. 
No. 608-99, n 2-2b (15 Nov. 1978). 
24. See notes 38-45 infra and accompanying text. 
25. "The Army has no legal authority to deduct money from a military member's 
pay without his consent for the benefit of dependents unless garnishment has been or-
dered .... " Army Regs. No. 608-99, n 1-3(d) (15 Nov. 1978). See also id. n 2-2(b). 
26. See notes 49-53 infra and accompanying text, for a discussion of the advantages 
and disadvantages of the military approach. 
27. "Each claim of nonsupport will be considered individually by the member's im-
mediate commander." Army Regs. No. 608-99, n 2-1(e) (15 Nov. 1978). Absent a court 
order, "[c]ommanders must strive to have the individuals arrive at a solution acceptable 
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pursuing support through military channels initiates the internal 
process by writing a letter to the service member's commanding 
officer requesting help in obtaining support.28 Regulations re-
quire the commanding officer to advise the service member of 
Army policy on the f111fiJ1ment of support obligations.29 Regula-
tions not only require the member to provide "adequate and 
continuous support" for his dependents,50 but also set forth a 
minimum amount to be used for that purpose.51 He is expected 
to provide support "in an amount not less than the Basic Allot-
ment for Quarters" (BAQ) at the prescribed rate for members of 
his rank with dependents. 52 If the BAQ allotment appears inade-
quate to meet the dependents' needs,55 the practitioner should 
to all concerned." Army Regs. No. 608-99, 11 2-2(b) (15 Nov. 1978). 
28. If the practitioner does not know where the service member is located, the letter 
should be addressed to the unit commander of the service member's last known address. 
The commander is required to "[f)orward complaints received after a service member 
has been reassigned [and to] [r]eply to all complainants, advising of the service mem-
ber's due date and the address to which correspondence should be sent •••• " Army 
Regs. No. 608-99, 11 2-6(j) (15 Nov. 1978). Familiarity with the applicable Army regula-
tions should be reflected in the letter. The commanding officer may be unaware of the 
regulation requirements in support matters. 
29. Army Regs. No. 608-99, 11 1-4 (15 Nov. 1978). 
30. ld. 11 1-3(a)(I). 
31. ld. 11 2-2(c). 
32. ld. The Basic Allotment for Quarters [BAQ] is a sum of money the Armed 
Forces allots the service member when rent-free government quarters are not furnished 
for his dependents. 37 U.S.C. § 403 (1976). See Dep't of Defense, Military Pay and Al-
lowances Entitlement Manual (Change No. 56), 11 30221 (1 Jan. 1967) [hereinafter cited 
as Pay Manual]. For the Armed Forces' definition of what constitutes a dependent for 
purposes of receipt of BAQ, see 37 U.S.C. § 401 (1976). Included are the service mem-
ber's spouse, unmarried minor children and, under certain circumstances, parents. Situa-
tions in which the member is not entitled to BAQ on behalf of the dependents are set 
forth in Pay Manual, supra, 11 30224(a). Exempted from entitlement are "dependent[s] 
for whom the member has been absolved of the requirement to provide support, [because 
of,] for example, desertion without cause, [or] marital infidelity." ld. 11 30224(a)(3). 
(Army regulations require, however, that "[t]he member will provide adequate support 
for his minor children, natural or adopted, regardless of desertion or other misconduct 
on the part of the spouse." Army Regs. No. 608-99, 11 2-1(c) (15 Nov. 1978». Members of 
the Armed Forces paying alimony to a former spouse pursuant to a divorce decree are 
not entitled to BAQ for that former spouse, Pay Manual, supra, 11 30224(a)(5), although 
a member's legitimate minor children are considered his dependents at all times, so that 
the member will receive the BAQ on their behalf. ld. (Change No. 58), 11 30232 (1 Jan. 
1967). The Army, however, will not provide BAQ to a service member for his children if 
the member is relieved of the support obligation by court order and does not pay any 
support for the children. Army Regs. No. 608-99, 11 2-3(f) (15 Nov. 1978). 
33. Army regulations specify that child support payments should be at the "with 
dependent rate" and not the lower BAQ rate paid to members without dependents. 
Army Regs. No. 608-99, 11 202(c) (15 Nov. 1978). The BAQ at the "with dependents" rate 
ranges from $160.80 per month for an entering private, Grade E-l to $479.10 per month 
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suggest a more reasonable amount. The commanding officer, 
however, generally will not determine what amount constitutes 
adequate support.34 
The commanding officer is required to encourage the service 
member to initiate allotments,311 but the Army cannot establish 
an allotment without the service member's consent.3S If the 
member authorizes an allotment, the Army withholds a specified 
amount from the member's monthly salary and forwards it di-
rectly to the dependents.37 
The commanding officer is also required to advise the ser-
vice member of possible consequences of not complying with 
Army regulations.3s Sanctions may include: (1) notation in his 
permanent record of the service member's failure to support his 
dependents, which hinders chances for promotion;39 (2) denial of 
the opportunity to re-enlist;40 (3) termination of the BAQ when 
used improperly;41 (4) administrative discharge;42 and (5) court 
martial.43 Threat of these sanctions may be sufficient to prompt 
for a general or admiral, Grade 0-10. The service member's pay schedule, including the 
BAQ rate, is a matter of public record. See 37 U.S.C. § 1009 (Supp. III 1979). See also 
note 10 supra. 
34. The commanding officer's role is primarily one of mediation. Army Regs. No. 
60S-99, 11 2-2(b) (15 Nov. 1975). 
35. Id. 1111 2-1(b), 2-6(f), 2-6(h). 
36. At one time, the Army had authority to force an allotment (termed a "Class Qtt 
allotment) on any service member shown not to be supporting his dependents. In 1963 
the Army abandoned the practice as applied to higher ranking enlisted personnel and 
since then has abandoned it altogether. Toms, Support of Military Dependents, 6 J. 
FAM. L. 15, 23 (1966). Class Q allotments were terminated because of the feeling that the 
military member should not be denied the dignity of handling his own affairs. However, 
Lieutenant Commander ,Toms states, "the mandatory class Q allotment system avoided 
a great proportion of the problem for the military organization .••• tt Id. at 24. Other 
branches of the Armed Forces may still permit mandatory allotments. 
37. See Pay Manual, supra note 32, (Change No. 50) at 11 60201, for the regulations 
governing allotments to dependents of members of the Armed Forces. See 37 U.S.C. §§ 
701, 702 (1976), for the statutes permitting allotments for the Army, Navy, Air Force, 
and Marines. The practitioner should urge the commanding officer to encourage the ini-
tiation of an allotment. It is more reliable than depending on the service member to send 
the payments. 
3S. Army Regs. No. 60S-99, 11 2-6(d) (15 Nov. 1978). 
39. Id. 11 1-3(b)(l) (15 Nov. 1978). 
40. Id. 11 1-3(b)(2) (15 Nov. 1978). 
41. Pay Manual, supra note 32, (Change No. 5S), at 11 30236 (1 Jan. 1967). See note 
49 infra, for a discussion of BAQ termination. 
42. Army Regs. No. 60S-99, 11 1-3(b) (3) (15 Nov. 1978). 
43. Army regulations state that, "willful neglect of support may result in court mar-
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the service member to initiate payments. The frequency with 
which sanctions are actually imposed is unknown. Expulsion 
from the service for failure to pay support seems rare!4 The 
commanding officer has great discretion in recommending to his 
superiors that sanctions be imposed.45 
If the commanding officer is unable to convince the service 
member to initiate allotments, or otherwise to agree to make 
support payments, he may refer the service member to the Staff 
Judge Advocate, Legal Assistance Officer, Army Community 
Services, or Chaplain for counseling.46 Regardless of the out-
come, the commanding officer is required to respond to the non-
support letter, providing information on what has transpired, 
and assurance that any acts promised by the member will be 
monitored to ensure compliance.4'7 If it becomes apparent that 
no satisfactory arrangement can be made, the commanding of-
ficer will advise the parties to resolve their problems in civil 
court.48 
The military approach offers the practitioner an alternative 
to seeking a support order through a civilian court. Because the 
service member's ·commanding officer is involved, however, there 
is the risk that the service member may face sanctions which 
will injure his career. Any action hindering the service member's 
advancement opportunities could financially penalize the depen-
tial under Article 92." [d. 11 2-6(d). 
44. "[E]limination of recalcitrant individuals is a drastic measure which involves the 
waste of the substantial investment in the training and maintenance of the member." 
Toms, supra note 36, at 17. 
45. Army regulations advise the commander to consider recommending sanctions 
when a service member has acted in a manner which may discredit the Army. Army 
Regs. No. 608-99, 1I1-3(b), (c) (15 Nov. 1978). See discussion at note 32 supra, regarding 
11 30224(a)(3) of the Pay Manual, and Army Regs. No. 608-99, 11 2-1(c) (15 Nov. 1978). 
Nonsupport of a spouse shown to be disloyal to a member of the Navy will not result in 
disciplinary action. 32 C.F.R. § 715.12(a) (1980). For the type of evidence of infidelity the 
Navy requires to justify a determination the service member need not support his 
spouse, see 32 C.F.R. § 715.12(a)(I)(2) (1980). Infidelity may be proved by way of affida-
vit by the service member, relatives or others, or written admissions by the wife in letters 
to the service member. 
46. Army Regs. No. 608-99, 11 2-2(b) (15 Nov. 1978). 
47. [d. 11 2-6(c). The regulation states, "It is essential that the complainant be given 
a complete reply by the commander, one that is courteous and factual, without evasion 
and vague promises, and with no hint of 'brush off.''' [d. 
48. [d. 11 2-2(b). 
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dents as well:'9 If the practitioner believes nothing short of a 
court-ordered garnishment will succeed, the dependents' interest 
may be best served by avoiding contact with the commanding 
officer .110 
Use of the military channels is best suited to the service 
member likely to cooperate upon intervention by his superiors. 
Further, if the practitioner foresees significant problems in ob-
taining a final support judgment while the obligor is a member 
of the Armed Forces, the military approach may become more 
compelling.1I1 The practitioner should be aware that the com-
manding officer may resist the practitioner's efforts to use mili-
tary channels because the Armed Forces do not attach primary 
importance to their role as arbitrator of the domestic affairs of 
their members.1I2 Therefore, the quality of the relationship be-
tween the commanding officer and the practitioner will, to a 
great extent, determine the success or failure of the military 
avenue. liS 
49. For instance, if the Army finds the service member is not forwarding the BAQ to 
the dependents, it may terminate the BAQ. Pay Manual, supra note 32, (Change No. 58) 
at 1f 30236. Additionally it can collect from the member any BAQ portion paid to the 
service member but not provided to the dependents. Army Regs. No. 608-99, 11 2-3(d)(1) 
(15 Nov. 1978). Army poliey requires, however, that even if the BAQ is terminated, the 
service member must still pay an adequate amount to his dependents. ld. 11 2-3(d)(2). 
Without the BAQ, lower-ranking members may find it difficult to provide even a few 
dollars a month. But see Clarke v. Clarke, 25 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1941), in which the court 
stated: "[D]efendant's salary of $84.00 per month is almost net to him, in that during the 
next year he will have no expenses for food, clothing and shelter. On the other hand, the 
wife will be obliged to pay rent and purchase food for herself and the children." ld. at 64. 
50. Availability of sanctions may be of use in encouraging voluntary compliance 
from a reluctant service member. The practioner or dependents can write the member 
directly, reminding him of the sanctions for nonsupport and of the potential harm to his 
career if his commanding officer becomes involved in the dispute. 
51. See discussion at notes 54-123 infra, detailing potential problems which may 
arise. 
52. The goal is to have the military member take care of his re-
sponsibilities with the least expense to the military organiza-
tion •••. The very small percentage [of service members] 
who do require supervision occupy an inordinate amount of 
time of those officers exercising supervision, keeping them-
selves and the officers from productive effort in the military 
mission. 
Toms, supra note 37, at 33-34. Army regulations state: "Each member is expected to 
. keep reasonable contact with dependents to minimi2e inquiries, claims, and complaints 
that are sent to the Army." Army Regs. No. 608-99,11 2-1(d) (15 Nov. 1978). 
53. The Armed Forces also provide free legal services to active and retired service 
members and their spouse and children for all personal legal matters. Army Regs. No. 
Women's Law Forum 
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n. ACQUIRING A STATE COURT JUDGMENT OF 
SUPPORT 
If the practitioner is unsuccessful in obtaining support for 
the dependents through military channels, or decides it is in the 
best interest of the clients to forego that avenue, M the next step 
is to obtain a judgment of support. The obstacles the practi-
tioner may encounter in the efforts to obtain the judgment 
against a service member will be discussed below. The first area 
addressed is the limitations the Army imposes upon personally 
serving one of its members with process on base.1I11 The second 
area concerns the SSCRA.1I6 As shall be seen, the SSCRA will 
only be a problem for the practitioner when the service member 
requests a stay of the proceedings under the SSCRA, or the 
practitioner seeks a default judgment. The practitioner will pre-
vail, however, in either situation if the court finds the service 
member's ability to defend is not "materially affected" because 
of his military service. II? The practitioner should proceed in ob-
taining the judgment of support as against 'any other obligor, 
bearing the following considerations in mind. 
A. SERVICE OF PROCESS 
The court must have jurisdiction over the service member in 
order for a support judgment to be valid. liS Jurisdiction exists 
when the service member (1) has reasonable notice of the sup-
port action,1I9 and (2) has a sufficient connection with the forum 
60S-50, 1111 6(a), (b), 7(a) (22 Feb. 1974). The dependents can contact the Judge Advocate 
General at the nearest military base to obtain the services of the Legal Services Officer. 
They may even consult with a legal assistance officer from another branch of the Armed 
Forces. ld. 11 5(a)(1). To eliminate any conflict of interest, the dependents are seen by 
one legal assistance officer and the service member by another. The officer is limited to 
advising the parties of their rights and negotiating agreements between them. ld. '\I 4. It 
may be in the best interest of the dependents for the practitioner to refer them to the 
legal assistance officer when it appears the situation can be resolved without the neces-
sity of court action. Such a referral helps minimize the expense to dependents who may 
already be overwhelmed financially. Where it appears the matter cannot be resolved 
without court intervention, the legal assistance officer will usually refer the parties to 
private counsel. ld. 11 4(d). 
54. See notes 49-53 supra and accompanying text. 
55. See notes 58-73 infra and accompanying text. 
56. See notes 74-167 infra and accompanying text for the SSCRA discussion per-
taining to obtaining a support judgment. 
57. See notes 124-167 infra and accompanying text. 
58. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (197S). 
59.ld. 
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so that it is fair to require him to defend there.60 
Personal service is considered the most effective means to 
give the respondent notice.61 Some jurisdictions require the 
practitioner to make a "reasonable effort" to serve the respon-
dent personally before alternate means may be employed.62 The 
simple task of personal service upon the obligor can be frus-
trated by the Army's policy of limiting access to on-base mem-
bers for purposes of personal service.63 
Army restrictions upon personal service vary according to 
the type of interest the federal government maintains over the 
particular base.64 The practitioner must determine whether the 
60. Id. The practitioner will generally experience little difficulty establishing a suffi-
cient connection between the service member and the forum when jurisdiction is based 
upon residence or domicile within that forum even though he may be stationed else-
where. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 29, 30 (1971). However, 
where jurisdiction is based upon his presence in the forum in which he is temporarily 
stationed, interesting questions regarding the sufficiency of his connection can arise, if 
that presence is his only contact with the forum. The issues which may arise include 
whether he is physically present within the state when he is stationed on federal terri-
tory within the state's boundaries, and whether his presence is voluntary. The practi-
tioner needs also to consider the extent to which mere presence as a basis for jurisdiction 
has been replaced by minimum contacts and fundamental fairness analysis. See Glen, An 
Analysis of "Mere Presence" and Other Traditional Bases for Jurisdiction, 45 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 607 (1979); Comment, Minimum Contacts Analysis of In Personam Juris-
diction Over Individuals Based on Presence, 33 ARK. L. REv. 159 (1979). Fundamental 
fairness analysis would require the practitioner to consider whether the service member 
has purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of the forum state so 
that it is fair to impose jurisdiction. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer 
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). A discussion of 
these issues is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
6!. "Per!!onal service is still the recommended method of serving a summons and 
there is no question that it is a legal method of service." 4A J. GODDARD, CALIFORNIA 
PRACTICE, FAMILY LAW PRACTICE § 814 (3d ed. 1981). See generally CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 415.10 (West Supp. 1981). 
62. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. FAM. CT. ACT § 427(b) (McKinney 1975): "If after reasonable 
effort, personal service is not made, the court may • . . make an order providing for 
substituted service .... " See also Zinger v. Zinger, 78 Misc. 2d 197, 356 N.Y.S.2d 177 
(1974) (service by mail is permissible, in the court's discretion, only where petitioner had 
been unable to effectuate personal service or substituted service). 
63. The Army's policy is discussed at notes 64-73 infra and accompanying text. For 
Navy regulations on service of process, see 32 C.F.R. § 720.20 (1979). Occasionally service 
members claim immunity from service of process solely by virtue of their military status. 
See, e.g., Murrey v. Murrey, 216 Cal. 707, 16 P.2d 741, cert. denied, 289 U.S. 740 (1932), 
rejecting this defense. 
64. See generally Army Regs. No. 27-40 (15 June 1973) setting forth Army policy on 
service of process. 
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base is held under exclusive federal jurisdiction, concurrently 
with the state, or under a mere proprietorial interest.65 The 
practitioner should contact the Staff Judge Advocate of the par-
ticular base in question to determine the nature of the federal 
interest involved. 66 ~ 
When the federal government holds the base concurrently 
with the state, or has a proprietorial interest, the service mem-
ber's commander will help the practitioner perfect service, be-
cause state law applies throughout the area.67 He will try to per-
suade the member to accept' service voluntarily.6s If the 
commander is unsuccessful, Army regulations require that he as-
sist civil authorities by making the service member available for 
service.69 
If the base is held under exclusive federal jurisdiction, the 
commander is required only to talk to the member about volun-
tary acceptance.70 If the member refuses to accept service, the 
practitioner will be advised that, because federal jurisdiction is 
exclusive, personal service within the base is precluded.71 In 
most instances, however, a state which yields exclusive jurisdic-
tion to the United States also reserves the right to serve process 
within the ceded area.72 If such a reservation exists, the com-
mander will make the service member available for service.78 
65. [d. 
66. Army Regs. No. 405-20, 11 6(c) (1 Aug. 1973). Large bases may consist of several 
parcels of land acquired at different times and subject to different conditions. See Krull 
v. United States, 240 F.2d 122, 127 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 915 (1957), for an 
example of the difficulty of attempting to prove the type of jurisdiction exerted over 
separate parts of a federal reservation. 
67. Army Regs. No. 27-40, 1I1-5(b)(3)(c) (15 June 1973). 
68. [d. 
69. [d. 
70. [d. 11 1-5(b)(3)(b). 
71. [d. 
72. "Among the rights most commonly reserved by the states, in yielding jurisdic-
tion to the United States, is the right to serve process within the ceded area." Dep't of 
Army Pamphlet No. 27-21, Military Administrative Law Handbook, 11 6.10(e), at 6-82. 
See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 119 (West 1980). 
73. Army Regs. No. 27-40, 1I1-5(b)(3)(c) (15 June 1973). When a state has reserved 
the right to serve process, that right may not necessarily extend to service of process 
from other states, absent such provision in the reservation. For example, a process server 
in Utah was denied permission to enter a local base to serve process received by Utah 
from Maine because, under the Utah cession statutes, the right to serve process did not 
extend to process received from other states. 5 Digest of Opinions 472, § 25.9 (1955). 
Army regulations state that, under those circumstances, the commander will not assist in 
11
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If personal service upon the member is impossible, substi-
tuted methods of service in accordance with forum state law 
must be attempted. The practitioner may avoid Army restric-
tions completely by having the member personally served off-
base. 
B. THE SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF ACT 
Before the passage of the SSCRA in 1918,74 a service mem-
ber occasionally discovered that, while serving in the military, 
someone had obtained a default judgment against him and con-
fiscated his possessions to satisfy the judgment.75 In times of 
war, governments would occasionally declare a moratorium on 
all actions against service members, to prevent civilians from 
taking unfair advantage of a member of the Armed Forces.76 To 
avoid granting temporary immunity to all members, Congress 
enacted the SSCRA to protect service member's rights only 
under certain circumstances.77 Under the Act, a service member 
service unless the service member voluntarily agrees to accept it. Army Regs. No. 27-40, 
~ 1-5(b)(3) (15 June 1973). 
74. The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 virtually restated the SSCRA 
of 1918. Compare 40 Stat. 440 (1918) with 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501-591 (1976). 
75. See generally Skilton, note 13 supra. 
76. [d. at 178-80. Moratoriums were used as a device "to preserve an existing social 
pattern during a period which is believed to be unusual and temporary in character." [d. 
at 179. Persons who wanted to bring suit against a member of the Armed Forces had to 
wait until the moratorium ended. Even absent moratoriums, some courts held service 
members exempt from suit as a matter of public policy. See, e.g., Land Title & Trust Co. 
v. Rambo, 174 Pa. 566, 34 A. 207 (1896). 
77. The purpose, as expressed in the SSCRA, is as follows: 
In order to provide for, strengthen, and expedite the national 
defense under the emergent conditions which are threatening 
the peace and security of the United States and to enable the 
United States the more successfully to fulfill the requirements 
of the national defense provision is made to suspend enforce-
ment of civil liabilities' in certain cases, of persons in the mili-
tary service of the United States in order to enable such per-
sons to devote their entire energy to the defense needs of the 
Nation, and to this end the following provisions are made for 
the temporary suspension of legal proceedings and transac-
tions which may prejudice the civil rights of persons in such 
service during the period herein specified over which this Act 
• • . remains in force. 
50 U.S.C. app. § 510 (1976). 
The Supreme Court has stated that the SSCRA is to "be read with an eye friendly 
to those who dropped their affairs to answer their country's call." Le Maistre v. Leffers, 
333 U.S. I, 6 (1948). The Act is not intended to function as a shield behind which the 
service member can avoid legal obligations. See, e.g., Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561 
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can obtain a stay of the proceedings if a judge determines his 
ability to defend is materially affected by his military service.'18A 
default judgment cannot be entered against a service member at 
least until an attorney is appointed to safeguard his interests. '19 
In attempting to obtain a support judgment agafust a mem-
ber of the Armed Forces, practitioners are occasionally con-
fronted with the SSCRA's stay and default provisions.80 The fol-
lowing is a discussion of (1) the SSCRA's stay provision,81 (2) its 
default provision,82 and (3) factors the courts consider in grant-
ing a stay request or granting entry of a default judgment.8s In-
cluded throughout are suggestions for ways to minimize the pos-
sibility the SSCRA will be successfully used to the detriment of 
the dependents.84 It will become apparent that the SSCRA 
should rarely bar the practitioner from obtaining a judgment of 
support.85 
The Stay Provision 
The stay provision provides that a service member's appli-
cation for a stay shall be granted unless the court feels his abil-
ity to conduct his defense is not materially affected by reason of 
his military service.86 It is silent both as to who has the burden 
(1943), in which the Court, affirming the lower court's denial of a stay, quoted the lower 
court which had found that the service member had " 'only sought to use the provisions 
of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act as a shield for his wrongdoing.''' ld. The 
lower court had concluded, that" 'this Court, who once wore a U.S. uniform with pride, 
does not intend for this to be done.''' ld. at 571. 
78. The stay provision is found at 50 U.S.C. app. § 521 (1976). See notes 86-97 infra 
and accompanying text. 
79. The default provision is found at 50 U.S.C. app. § 520 (1976). See notes 98-123 
infra and accompanying text. 
80. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 222 Ga. 246, 149 S.E.2d 468 (1966); Kerrin v. Kerrin, 
97 Cal. App. 2d 913, 218 P.2d 1004 (1950); McGlynn v. McGlynn, 178 Misc. 530, 35 
N.Y.S.2d 6 (1942). 
81. See notes 86-97 infra and accompanying text. 
82. See notes 98-123 infra and accompanying text. 
83. See notes 124-167 infra and accompanying text. 
84. See, e.g., notes 139-150 infra and accompanying text. 
85. See notes 124-167 infra and accompanying text. 
86. 50 U.S.C. app. § 521 (1976). The statute provides: 
At any stage thereof any action or proceeding in any court in 
which a person in military service is involved, either as plain-
tiff or defendant, during the period of such service or within 
sixty days thereafter may, in the discretion of the court in 
which it is pending, on its own motion, and shall, on applica-
tion to it by such person or some person on his behalf, be 
13
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of proving the member will or will not be prejudiced,s7 and as to 
the quantum of proof required. 
The United States Supreme Court has held within the trial 
court's discretion the decision whether the service member must 
make a showing of impaired ability to defend, or whether his 
adversary must come forward with evidence that he is not 
prejudiced.ss A service member, however, usually will not be 
granted a stay upon the mere showing that he is in the .mili-
tary,S9 unless the motion goes unopposed or the service member 
is stationed overseas.90 
[d. 
Generally, California requires the service member to make a 
stayed as provided in this Act . . . unless, in the opinion of 
the court, the ability of plaintiff to prosecute the action or the 
defendant to conduct his defense is not materially affected by 
reason of his military services. 
87. See Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 569 (1942) ("The Act makes no express 
provision as to who must carry the burden of showing that a party will or will not be 
prejudiced, in pursuance no doubt of its policy of making the law flexible to meet the 
great variety of situations no legislator and no court is wise enough to foresee."). 
88. See id. at 569-70. Mter referring to the statute's failure to address the burden of 
proof question, the Court stated: "We too, refrain from declaring any rigid doctrine of 
burden of proof in this matter, believing that courts called upon to use discretion will 
usually have enough sound sense to know from what direction their information should 
be expected to come." [d. at 569. See also Bond v. Bond, 547 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1976), which held that the trial court has wide discretion in deciding which party should 
carry the burden of proof on the issue of prejudice. 
89. The Act Cannot be construed to require continuance on mere 
showing that the defendant was in Washington in the military 
service. Canons of statutory construction admonish us that we 
should not needlessly render as meaningless the language 
which, after authorizing stays says, "unless, in the opinion of 
the court, the ability of plaintiff to prosecute the action or the 
defendant to conduct his defense is not materially affected by 
reason of his military service." 
319 U.S. at 565. See also Johnson v. Johnson, 59 Cal. App. 2d 375, 382, 139 P.2d 33, 37 
(1943) ("The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 does not grant an absolute 
right to stay whenever it is made to appear that one of the parties is in the military 
service."). 
90. See, e.g., Mays v. Tharpe & Brooks, Inc., 148 Ga. App. 815, 240 S.E.2d 159 
(1977) (stay proper where the record indicated only that the service member was in mili-
tary service in the Philippines and no evidence was presented by his adversary showing 
his rights would not be materially affected); Parker v. Parker, 207 Ga. 588, 63 S.E.2d 366 
(1951) (stay proper where husband stationed overseas and wife offered no e~dence that 
his rights would not be materially impaired); and Lankford v. Milholin, 197 Ga. 227, 28 
S.E.2d 752 (1944) (a stay should be granted upon bare application unless it appears no 
material impairment exists). 
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prima facie showing for relief.91 The amount of proof is much 
less than is required from a litigant requesting a limited contin-
uance independent of the Act.92 The burden then shifts to the 
party resisting postponement to show the member is not materi-
ally affected by his military service.9s 
When the member requests a stay, the practitioner must be 
prepared to argue that ability to defend is not prejudiced.94 
Even if the court grants a stay of the support proceeding, the 
practitioner should request temporary support for the duration 
of the stay. The SSCRA permits the court to grant stays subject 
to whatever terms justice requires.91S Many courts have been will-
ing to award dependents temporary support while the stay is in 
effect.9s Some courts have gone so far as to grant the service 
member a stay on condition that he provide temporary support 
pending the outcome of the action.97 
91. See Chaffey v. Chaffey, 59 Cal.2d 792, 797, 382 P.2d 365, 368, 31 Cal. Rptr. 325, 
328 (1963). ("[W]hen a prima facie showing for relief is made, the statute in effect, places 
the burden of persuasion, if not of proof, upon the party resisting a postponement 
•..• ") (relying on Pacific Greyhound Lines v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 2d 61, 67, 168 
P.2d 665, 668 (1946». The court held the trial court abused its discretion in denying the 
service member's stay request in a child custody matter. 
92. Miller v. Miller, 26 Cal. 2d 119, 125, 156 P.2d 931, 934 (1945); Johnson v. John-
son, 59 Cal. App. 2d 375, 392, 139 P.2d 33, 42 (1943). 
93. Chaffey v. Chaffey, 59 Cal. 2d 792, 797, 382 P.2d 365, 368, 31 Cal. Rptr. 325, 328 
(1963). 
94. See notes 124-167 infra and accompanying text for the factors courts consider in 
• determining prejudice. 
95. The SSCRA provides that a stay may remain in effect "subject to such terms as 
may be just . • • ." 50 U.S.C. app. § 524 (1976). 
96. See Hagen v. Hagen, 207 Ark. 1007, lOll, 183 S.W.2d 785, 787 (1944); Gilmore v. 
Gilmore, 185 Misc. 535, 58 N.Y.S.2d 556 (1945) (the court allowed a stay of the divorce 
proceedings until termination of the defendant's military service, but provided for 
spousal support and an allowance for the wife's counsel); and Jelks v. Jelks, 207 Ark. 475, 
476, 181 S.W.2d 235, 236 (1944). But see Smith v. Smith, 222 Ga. 246, 149 S.E.2d 468 
(1966), in which the court reversed the trial court's award of temporary alimony and 
child support. 
97. See, e.g., Shelton v. Shelton, 248 Ala. 48, 26 So.2d 553 (1946), in which the trial 
court granted the service member a stay of the divorce action conditioned upon payment 
of $40 per month spousal support pendente lite. The Alabama Court did not reach the 
legality of the stay order. It dismissed the appeal as moot because the service member 
was discharged from the military before the submission of his appeal. See also Brown v. 
Brown, 89 Ga. App. 428, 80 S.E.2d 2 (1953), in which the trial court, after granting a stay 
of the support proceedings, granted a further stay at the second hearing on condition 
that the service member pay the wife $125 in alimony per month. Upon the service mem-
ber's failure to fulfill the condition, the stay was terminated. As no appeal was had from 
the second order, the court of appeal did not reach the legality of that order. See also 
Ahrens v. Ahrens, 229 Ky. 497, 185 S.W.2d 694 (1945) (court affirmed the trial court's 
15
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The Default Provision 
If a service member fails to make any appearance in the 
civil suit, the practitioner may seek a default judgment against 
him only after the requirements set forth in the SSCRA default 
provision are fulfilled.9s Under the Act, the practitioner must in-
itially file an affidavit with the court, stating the respondent is in 
the military.99 The court must then appoint an attorney to pro-
tect the service member's interests.IOO The court will permit en-
try of default judgment where no apparent prejudice to defen-
dant exists. If the court allows entry of default, and it later 
appears the member was prejudiced because of military service, 
he may have the judgment reopened for consideration of further 
evidence.lol The following questions frequently arise concerning 
the default provision: (1) What constitutes "any appearance" by 
the service member so as to deny him the benefits of the 
SSCRA's default provision? (2) Who obtains and pays for the 
granting of a stay on condition that the service member pay temporary alimony, but 
modified the amount). 
98. The default provision, found at 50 U.S.C. app. § 520 (1976), provides in part: 
(1) In any action or proceeding commenced in any court, if 
there shall be a default of any appearance by the defendant, 
the plaintiff, before entering judgment shall me in the court 
an affidavit setting forth facts showing that the defendant is 
not in military service. If unable to me such affidavit plaintiff 
shall in lieu thereof me an affidavit setting forth either that 
the defendant is in the military service or that plaintiff is not 
able to determine whether or not defendant is in such service. 
If an affidavit is not filed showing that the defendant is not in 
the military service, no judgment shall be entered without first 
securing an order of court directing such entry, and no such 
order shall be made if the defendant is in such service until 
after the court shall have appointed an attorney to represent 
defendant and protect his interest, and the court shall on ap-
plication make such appointment. Unless it appears that the 
defendant is not in such service the court may require, as a 
condition before judgment is entered, that the plaintiff file a 
bond approved by the court conditioned to indemnify the de-
fendant, if in military service, against any loss or damage that 
he may suffer by reason of any judgment should the judgment 
be thereafter set aside in whole or in part. And the court may 
make such other and further order or enter such judgment as 
in its opinion may be necessary to protect the rights of the 
defendant under this Act. 
(Citations omitted.) 
99. [d. 
100. [d. 
101. [d. 520(4). 
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service member's appointed attorney? (3) What are the ap-
pointed attorney's duties? (4) Under what circumstances may 
the service member reopen a default judgment? 
To retain the benefits of the default provision, the service 
member cannot make either a general or special appearance, 
personally or through retained counsel.102 Therefore, if the ser-
vice member unsuccessfully makes a special appearance to chal-
lenge jurisdiction, the court can enter a default judgment with-
out appointing an attorney for him. Should a default judgment 
be entered, it will not later be permitted to be reopened. lOS On 
the other hand, there is no "appearance" where the service 
member, or someone acting on his behalf, contacts the court re-
questing relief for the member under the SSCRA.IIH It is viewed 
as a communication to the judge as an individual and not to the 
102. See Cloyd v. Cloyd, 564 S.W.2d 337 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978), in which the court 
rejected the service member's argument that his divorce judgment, which included a pro-
vision for spousal and child support, was a default judgment and thereby void because 
no attorney was appointed to represent and protect his interest. Mter holding the judg-
ment entered was not a default, the court held there was no "default of any appearance" 
within the meaning of the SSCRA, where the member's former attorney had filed a gen-
eral denial and withdrawn from the case before trial. "For there to be such a default the 
defendant must not have made a general appearance at any time while the suit was 
pending." 564 S.W.2d at 344. See also Reynolds v. Reynolds, 21 Cal. 2d 580, 134 P.2d 
251 (1943), in which defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
The court held the motion constituted an appearance. The court stated: 
There is no "default of any appearance" in such a case even 
though the defendant chooses to make only a special appear-
ance to contest the jurisdiction of the court and therefore lim-
its the authority of his attorneys to that issue. If that course 
proves ineffective he can hardly contend that he was not rep-
resented by counsel. There is nothing in the Soldiers' and 
Sailors' Civil Relief Act requiring the court to disregard the 
appointment of attorneys by the defendant and the course of 
action he decides upon and to appoint another attorney to em-
bark upon another course of action on defendant's behalf. 
ld. at 586,134 P.2d at 255. See also Blankenship v. Blankenship, 263 Ala. 297, 82 So.2d 
335 (1955). 
103. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 21 Cal. 2d 580, 586, 134 P.2d 251, 255 (1943). 
104. See, e.g., Allen v. Allen, 30 Cal. 2d 433,182 P.2d 551 (1947) in which respon-
dent service member was not notified of the hearing to increase the support amount. 
Notice was served on his former divorce attorney who appeared at the hearing only to 
inform the court that he could not locate the service member and was not authorized to 
represent him. The court held the service member made no appearance within the mean-
ing of the default provision. See also Rutherford v. Bentz, 345 lli. App. 532, 104 N.E.2d 
343 (1952) which held that a telegram to the judge requesting rights under the SSCRA 
does not constitute an appearance. 
17
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court. 1011 
The presence of counsel appointed in accordance with the 
default provision does not, of course, constitute an appearance 
to later deprive the service member of having the judgment re-
opened.los It may be considered an appearance, however, if the 
service member begins to actively participate in his defense 
through the appointed attorney, treating the attorney as if re-
tained by the member.l07 Protection afforded the service mem-
ber applies only when the appointed attorney acts under author-
ity of the court rather than that of the service member. lOS 
Once the court is satisfied the service member has made no 
appearance in the action, the court will appoint an attorney to 
represent his interests.l09 The default provision, however, does 
not specify who obtains the appointed attorney. Local court 
rules may provide the practitioner with guidance. Otherwise, it 
has been suggested that the dependents select an attorney will-
ing to act on the service member's behalf and to attach written 
consent to an ex parte application for appointment of counsel.110 
The default provision is silent about compensation of the 
appointed attorney. One court has held the services of the ap-
pointed attorney "are to be regarded as a patriotic duty for 
which no compensation would be expected by members of a pro-
105. Rutherford v. Bentz, 345 ill. App. 432, 104 N.E.2d 343 (1952). 
106. Kerig, The Absent Defendant and the Federal Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Re-
lief Act, 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 975, 981 (1958). 
107. See, e.g., Sanders v. Sanders, 63 Wash. 2d 709, 388 P.2d 942 (1964). 
108. ld. at 713, 388 P.2d at 945. 
109. 50 U.S.C. app. § 520 (1976). 
110. 4A. J. GODDARD, supra note 61, at §§ 925-929. Further, Goddard suggests the ex 
parte application be accompanied by an affidavit by petitioners which should include the 
following: 
Respondent is in a designated branch of the military service; 
respondent's mailing address in such service; proof of service 
is on file showing that the resondent was duly served with 
summons and copy of the petition on a given date; respondent 
has not filed a response, and that the time for him to plead 
has elapsed; and a named attorney at law of a specified ad-
dress has consented to accept appointment as attorney for 
such respondent, and that such consent is attached. 
ld. at 357-58 (footnote omitted). "The order should make no provision as to payment of 
fees of the [appointed] attorney." ld. For a discussion regarding compensation of the 
appointed attorney, see notes 111-113 infra and accompanying text. 
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fession deeply imbued by a sense of public responsibility."111 
Another court has held the attorney may be paid, but only for 
the time expended in obtaining a stay;1I2 the service member 
could not be required to pay for the appointed attorney's ser-
vices.lIs As a practical matter, unless the government agrees to 
bear the cost, dependents must retain and probably compensate 
the appointed attorney in order to obtain a default judgment.ll4 
The SSCRA requires the appointed attorney to "represent 
[the] defendant and protect his interest/tllG While it is not clear 
from the Act what this duty entails, it is generally believed the 
appointed attorney's obligation is to inform the service member 
of the proGeedings and determine how he wishes to proceed.ne If 
the service member authorizes the entry of default, the ap-
pointed counsel will so inform the court. The appointed attorney 
must request a stay of the proceedings if he or she determines 
the member is prejudiced in conducting his defense because of 
military service.lI'1 The court will probably not permit entry of 
111. In re Cool's Estate, 19 N.J. Misc. 236, 239, 18 A.2d 714, 717 (1941). 
112. In re Ehlke's Estate, 250 Wis. 583, 27 N.W.2d 754 (1947), modified, 251 Wis. 
57, 28 N.W.2d 884 (1947). The appointed attorney had worked 31 days as the service 
member's guardian ad litum and the court would only permit compensation for the time 
expended to obtain a stay, payable at a rate equal to that permitted by a Wisconsin 
statute for an attorney appointed to represent an indigent. Id. at 587-91,27 N.W.2d at 
756-59. 
113. Id. The court stated that the service member "is not liable to compensate [the 
appointed attorney] for he neither employed him nor consented to nor had knowledge of 
[his] appointment or rendition of service." Id. at 591, 27 N.W.2d at 758. See also In re 
Cool's Estate, 19 N.J. Misc. 236, 239, 18 A.2d 714, 717 (1941), in which the court stated 
that compensation is "[c]ertainIy not [chargeable] as against a party in military service." 
114. The likelihood the county will be required to bear the cost of providing attor-
neys for both the dependents and service member has discouraged the District Attor-
ney's Office in at least one county from initiating support actions against delinquent 
service members. Interview with Pierre Vaughn, Attorney, San Francisco District Attor-
ney's Office, Family Support Bureau (Sept. 27, 1979). 
115. 50 U.S.C. app. § 520 (1976). 
116. Bowery Savings Bank v. Pellegrino, 185 Misc. 912, 58 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1945). See 
also Borden, A Practical Approach to the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, 8 PRAC. 
LAW 65, 68 (Feb. 1962). 
117. See In re Ehlke's Estate, 250 Wis. 583, 27 N.W.2d 754, modified, 251 Wis. 57, 
28 N.W.2d 884 (1947), in which the court stated: "[t]he utmost service of a person ap-
pointed to appear for a soldier in the military service, either required or suggested, is 
toward procuring such temporary stay of proceedings as is necessary to protect the sol-
dier's interests." Id. at 588, 27 N.W.2d at 757. See also Dep't of Army Pamphlet No. 27-
166, Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, 11 3.4, at 3-4 (July, 1971) ("It seems that 
unless the defendant is able to be present for trial, to testify and fully cooperate in the 
defense, the primary purpose of the appointed attorney should be to obtain a stay until 
the defendant can be present."). 
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default judgment if there is evidence of prejudice to the service 
member. us 
Under the SSCRA, the service member may have a default 
judgment reopened to permit him to defend when it appears 
that, because of his engagement in the Armed Forces, he was 
prejudiced in making his defense.u9 The service member must 
request the reopening no later than ninety days after military 
service terminates.12D The request will be granted if the member 
has an apparently meritorious defense.121 The court will not per-
mit reopening if the service member acted in bad faith.122 In 
urging that a default judgment be entered, the dependents' at-
torney should remind the court that if, in hindsight, entry of the 
118. For the factors courts consider in granting entry of a default judgment, see 
notes 124-167 infra and accompanying text. 
, 119. 50 U.S.C. app. § 520 (1976). That section provides, in part, 
(4) If any judgment shall be rendered in any action or pro-
ceeding governed by this section against any person in mili-
tary service during the period of such service or within thirty 
days thereafter, and it appears that such person was 
prejudiced by reason of his military service in making his de-
fense thereto, such judgment may, upon application, made by 
such person or his legal representative, not later than ninety 
days after the termination of such service, be opened by the 
court rendering the same and such defendant or his legal rep-
resentative let in to defend; provided it is made to appear that 
the defendant has a meritorious or legal defense to the action 
or some part thereof. 
[d. See, e,g., Becknell v. D'Angelo, 506 S.W.2d 688 (Tex Civ. App. 1974), in which the 
appellate court affirmed the trial court's order vacating of a divorce decree where service 
member's inability to defend was "strongly supported by the evidence". [d. at 693. 
120. 50 U.S.C. app. § 520 (1976). Courts have firmly held to the 90-day limit, even 
where the service member was unaware of the judgment until after that time. Morris 
Plan Bank v. Nadsall, 202 Ga. 52, 41 S.E.2d 881 (1947). 
121. 50 U.S.C. app. § 520 (1976). See, e.g., Allen v. Allen, 30 Cal. 2d 433, 182 P.2d 
551 (1947). The service member was not represented by an attorney at a hearing in 
which he was ordered to pay a higher amount of support. He did not learn of the order 
until 27 months after it was made. The court held the member was "unquestionably 
prejudiced" and vacated the order, after noting the service member had a meritorious 
defense. [d. at 436, 182 P.2d at 553. 
122. See, e.g., Lamar v. Lamar, 19 Ariz. App. 128, 505 P.2d 566 (1973) (no prejudice 
where service member was informed of the divorce action, took no steps to protect his 
rights, and motion to vacate showed no meritorious defense); Wilterdink v. Wilterdink, 
81 Cal. App. 2d 526, 532, 184 P.2d 527, 532 (1947) (no prejudice where the service mem-
ber demonstrated by his conduct before entry of default that he would not assert a de-
fense); Burgess v. Burgess, 234 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1962) (the court refused to set aside a de-
fault separation decree because the service member was fully advised of the pending 
action, was always accessible to the court, and refused to accept notice by certified mail 
of the hearing date). 
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default judgment was error, the service member has a remedy 
under the reopening provision.123 
Factors Demonstrating Prejudice to the Service Member 
In deciding whether to grant a stay or permit entry of a de-
fault judgment, the court must determine whether the service 
member's ability to defend is materially affected~24 because of 
military duties.12C5 To determine the degree of prejudice to the 
member, courts ask two questions: (1) Is the service member 
available to appear at the proceedings?, 126 and (2) Is his appear-
ance necessary?12'1 The proximity of the forum to the base,126 the 
123. The court may require the dependents to file a bond before the default judg-
ment is entered, "to protect the rights of such [service members]." 50 U.S.C. app. § 
520(3) (1976). 
124. "Material effect" is an equitable principle expressed 'throughout the SSCRA. 
That expression or its equivalent is mentioned specifically in the following sections of 
the Act: 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 520(4)-523, 526, 530-532, 535-536, 560, 573, and 590 (1976). 
125. "Material effect" is specifically mentioned in the general stay provision. 50 
U.S.C. app. § 521 (1976). Its equivalent is only mentioned in the default provision when 
referring to reopening of the default judgment. 50 U.S.C. app. § 520(4) (1976). The de-
fault provision, however, has been interpreted to mean that a default judgment should 
be granted only when it appears that the service member's ability to defend is not mate-
rially affected by his military service. See, e.g., Lawther v. Lawther, 53 Pa. D. & C. 280 
(1945) (default divorce decree should be granted only if the absent service member knew 
of the proceedings, was within the United States, and was not prevented by his military 
service from defending the action or applying for a stay); and King v. King, 193 Misc. 
750,753,85 N.Y.S.2d 563, 566 (1948) ("this [default] provision was not intended ••• to 
prevent a judgment by default against a person in the military service if he was fully 
informed of the pendency of the action and had adequate time and opportunity to ap-
pear and defend •••• "). Indeed, the appointed attorney in a default proceeding should 
request a stay if it appears the service member will be unfairly prejudiced. See note 117 
supra and accompanying text. 
126. The United States Supreme Court has said, "[A]bsence when one's rights or 
liabilities are being adjudged is usually prima facie prejudicial" under the SSCRA. 
Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943). 
127. Ide at 569; Whealton v. Whealton, 67 Cal. 2d 656, 665, 432 P.2d 979, 985, 63 
Cal. Rptr. 291, 297 (1967); Johnson v. Johnson, 59 Cal. App. 2d 375, 390, 139 P.2d 33, 41 
(1943) ("[W]hile it is true that normally a litigant in the military service is entitled to be 
present at the trial in order to defend or prosecute his action adequately, that right is 
not absolute."). But see Mays v. Tharpe & Brooks, Inc., 143 Ga. App. 815, 817, 240 
S.E.2d 159, 160-61 (1977), stating, "A substantial right of a party to litigation is to be 
present at the trial and render assistance to his counsel as the developments unfold. 
Consequently, unless it is a situation in which no harm could accrue by reason of his 
absence ••• a member of the military service is entitled as of right to the stay." 
128. In Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561 (1943), the Court upheld a stay denial be-
cause, among other reasons, the service member was summoned into North Carolina 
state court while stationed in nearby Washington, D.C. See also Brown v. Brown, 89 Ga. 
App. 428, 80 S.E.2d 2 (1953) (denial of a stay affirmed where the forum was located in a 
county adjoining the county in which the service member was stationed). But see Mays 
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service member's ability to obtain leave,129 and current Armed 
Forces activity130 are factors used in determining availability. As 
to the necessity of his appearance, courts consider the nature of 
the action131 and the service member's relation to it.132 A discus-
sion of these considerations follows. Techniques to minimize the 
likelihood of a finding of prejudice to the service member are 
indicated, including use by the practitioner of the Uniform Re-
ciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA).133 
1. Proximity of the Forum 
The location of the forum is an important consideration in 
determining whether the service member will be available to at-
tend the proceedings.134 When he is stationed overseas, the 
v. Tharpe & Brooks, Inc.~ 143 Ga. App. 815, 240 S.E.2d 159 (1977) (stay granted where 
service member stationed in Philippines); and Starling v. Harris, 114 Ga. App. 282, 151 
S.E.2d 163 (1966) (stay granted where service member stationed in Korea). 
129. The Supreme Court considered the service member's failure to apply for leave 
in affirming the lower court's refusal to grant a stay in Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 
572-73 (1943). The Court asked, "Did he apply for a leave at all? The affidavit pretty 
clearly implied that he had not. We think the court had ample grounds for [its] opinion." 
[d. at 572. See also Derby v. Kim, 238 Ga. 429, 233 S.E.2d 156 (1977) (trial court erred in 
denying stay in custody dispute where father asserted he could not be available for the 
December hearing because he had used up all of his leave time for that year, but indi-
cated he could be available for a hearing in January). 
130. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 59 Cal. App. 2d 375, 383, 139 P.2d 33, 37 (1943) 
in which the court stated: 
It is a harsh thing to tell a litigant that he must wait to en-
force his cause of action until after the war. Witnesses or par-
ties may die, and witnesses may disappear or forget the fact. 
However, in the national interest, wherever the rights of one 
in the military service will be adversely affected unless a stay 
is given, the court must grant a stay. That is one price civil-
ians must pay in aiding the war effort. 
See also Bowsman v. Peterson, 45 ·F. Supp. 741, 743 (D. Neb. 1942) ("The soldier or 
sailor in seasons of war has neither time nor mental aptitude for litigation."). 
131. See, e.g., Mathis v. Mathis, 236 So.2d 755, 756-57 (Miss. S. Ct. 1970) ("Without 
holding that such a finding is required in every case, we are of the opinion that a pater-
nity suit is of such a personal and intimate nature that it is implicit that appellant's 
absence materially affects his defense unless a specific finding is made to the contrary."). 
132. See Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 569 (1943) (in determining prejudice to 
the service member, "[o]ne case may turn on an issue of fact as to which the party is an 
important witness"); and Semler v. Oertwig, 234 Iowa 233, 239, 12 N.W.2d 265, 270 
(1943) (finding "[t]he nature of the action, or his relation to it, or his lack of knowledge 
of the matters involved, may render [the service member's] presence at the trial unneces-
sary to an adequate protection of his rights."). 
133. See notes 139-150 infra and accompanying text. 
134. Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561 (1943); Brown v. Brown, 89 Ga. App. 428, 429, 
80 S.E.2d 2, 3 (1953). 
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courts are more inclined to find prejudice.1311 If the support ac-
tion is filed in the forum in which he is stationed, a finding of 
unavailability is doubtful,136 absent evidence of inability to ob-
tain leave/31 or the existence of war .138 
To minimize a finding of prejudice due to unavailability, the 
practitioner might consider litigating the support action in the 
forum in which the service member is stationed. To prevent any 
hardship to the dependents in the event that they do not reside 
nearby, URESA can be used to obtain a judgment of support.139 
URESA allows the dependents a local support hearing and, at 
the same time, permits the service member to present a defense 
in the forum in which he is stationed. Most states have adopted 
a form of URESA, although provisions vary from state to 
state.140 All duties of support-past, present, and future-are 
enforceable under the Act if enforceable in the reciprocal 
state. 141 
URESA generally operates as follows. The dependents 
demonstrate their need for support in a verified complaint filed 
in the county in which they reside.142 Once the initiating court 
determines the complaint alleges facts sufficient to show a duty 
135. See, e.g., Mays v. Tharpe & Brooks, Inc., 143 Ga. App. 815, 240 S.E.2d 159 
(1977); Starling v. Harris, 114 Ga. App. 282, 151 S.E.2d 163 (1966). 
136. See note 135 supra. 
137. See notes 151-154 infra and accompanying text. 
138. See notes 154-157 infra and accompanying text. 
139. The text of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act [URESA] is 
found at 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 643-801 (West Master ed. 1979). For California's 
version of the Act, see CAL. ClV. PRoe. CODE §§ 1650-1699 (West Supp. 1981). See gener-
ally Note, Uniform Reciprocal Legislation to Enforce Familial Duties of Support, 25 
DRAKE L. REV. 206 (1975), for a historical review of URESA. 
140. See 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, supra note 139, for the version of URESA 
adopted in each state. 
141. California provides that the duty of support under URESA includes: 
a duty of support whether imposed or imposable by law or by 
order, decree, or judgment of any court whether interlocutory 
or final or whether incidental to a proceeding for a dissolution 
of marriage, judgment of nullity, or for legal separation, or to 
an action for divorce, separation, separate maintenance, or 
otherwise and includes the duty to pay arrearages of support 
past due and unpaid. 
CAL. ClV. PRoe. CODE § 1653(b) (West Supp. 1981). URESA can thus be used to obtain 
as well as enforce judgments of support, provided they are permitted in the reciprocal 
state. 
142. See, e.g., CAL. ClV. PRoe. CODE §§ 1673, 1676 (West Supp. 1981). 
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of support is owed, it forwards its certification and the com-
plaint to the court in the jurisdiction in which the respondent 
resides.H3 After determining the respondent is located in its ju-
risdiction, the responding court will docket the case and notify 
the local prosecuting attorney.H. The prosecuting attorney be-
comes the dependents' attorney in the responding state and is 
required to take all action necessary to enable the court to ob-
tain jurisdiction over the service member. In At the hearing in 
the responding court, the service member may present evidence 
on his own behalf.I • 6 If it becomes necessary to conduct further 
examination of witnesses, the responding court may continue the 
proceedings until the witnesses are examined personally, 
through depositionsI .'1 or by interrogatories.H8 The responding 
state, applying its own laws, has the power to enter the order of 
support.I • 9 
Obtaining a support judgment through URESA seems ide-
ally suited for situations in which the parties are in different 
parts of the country. A possible drawback, however, is that by 
the time the complaint reaches the responding court, the service 
member may have been transferred elsewhere. URESA, how-
143. ld. § 1676. 
144. ld. § 1680(a). 
145. ld. § 1680(b) states, "The prosecuting attorney shall prosecute the case dili-
gently." It appears, however, that some district attorneys' offices do not act on URESA 
petitions against service members stationed in their forum, apparently because they be-
lieve they cannot obtain jurisdiction over them. Vaughn interview, supra note 114. For a 
discussion of potential jurisdiction problems, see note 60 supra. Inaction due to fear of 
losing the jurisdiction argument, particularly where there is no evidence the service 
member would contest jurisdiction, is not considered prosecuting the case "diligently." 
Section 1680(c) states that if the prosecuting attorney does not pursue the support ac-
tion, the Attorney General's office in that state may order the attorney to do so, or may 
undertake the representation itself. CAL. CIV. PRoe. CODE § 1680(c) (West Supp. 1980). 
146. CAL. CIV. PRoe. CODE § 1683 (West Supp. 1981). 
147.ld. 
148. "For those cases in which the husband raises a defense, the act provides a 
means for the wife to litigate the issue. In such a case the court must, on request of 
either party, continue the case for submission of her evidence." Hight v. Hight, 67 Cal. 
App. 3d 498, 503-04, 136 Cal. Rptr. 685, 690 (1977) (citations omitted). URESA contem-
plates that the prosecuting attorney "shall use the machinery of deposition and interrog-
atories .... " ld. URESA protects the due process rights of the defendant by affording 
him an opportunity to be heard and to examine and cross-examine by deposition the 
plaintiff and any other witnesses who have testified in the initiating states. Smith v. 
Smith, 125 Cal. App. 2d 154, 270 P.2d 613 (1954). Each litigant "pleads in the court of 
his or her own jurisdiction." Uniform Reciprocal Legislation, supra note 139, at 212. 
149. CAL. CIV. PRoe. CODE § 1682 (West Supp. 1981). 
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ever, does authorize the responding court to send the complaint 
on to the appropriate court.lllO Another potential drawback is 
that, because the District Attorney's office is a public agency, 
their attorneys may have less time to devote to the dependents' 
support action than one would expect from private counsel. The 
practitioner needs to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of 
URESA before using this approach. 
2. Ability to Obtain Leave 
When a court considers prejudice to the service member, it 
inquires into the likelihood of the service member obtaining 
leave.llll The Armed Forces try to accommodate the courts by 
making service members available to appear. Although the com-
manding officer must approve time off, leave is freely granted to 
members of the Army to respond to court orders, absent special 
circumstances.11l2 Even if the service member has depleted his 
accrued leave, the commanding officer can advance leavetime.11l8 
The member is not deprived of pay for that period of authorized 
leave. 1M 
3. Military Involvement 
The military involvement of the United States at the time 
of the support proceeding is a factor courts consider in deter-
mining the member's ability to attend. Clearly, courts are likely 
to find the service member's ability to defend materially affected 
when the Armed Forces are engaged in war.lllll The SSCRA was 
150. The service member's previous commanding officer is required to advise of the 
service member's new address. Army Regs. No. 608-99, ~ 2-6(j) (15 Nov. 1978). 
151. See, e.g., Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 572 (1943). The service member 
"might be expected to make some move to get leave to be present. If it were denied, he 
might be expected to expose every circumstance of his effort to the court in his plea for 
continuance." See also Derby v. Kim, 238 Ga. 429, 233 S.E.2d 156 (1977); Johnson v. 
Johnson, 59 Cal. App. 2d 375, 381, 389-90, 139 P.2d 33, 36, 41 (1943); and Semler v. 
Oertwig, 234 Iowa 233, 238, 12 N.W.2d 265, 270 (1943), in which the service member's 
"lack of diligence in protecting his rights when he could have, or his failure to obtain 
leave to be present when it might have been obtained, may be considered." 
152. Interview with Captain William D. Raymond, Legal Assistance Officer, United 
States Army, at the Presidio (Oct. 2, 1979). The Navy has a sinliIar policy. See 32 C.F.R. 
§ 720.20(e) (1980), which states: "[t]he commanding officer normally should grant leave 
or liberty to the person served in order to permit him to comply with the process; pro-
vided, such absence will not prejudice the best interests of the naval service." 
153. Army Regs. No. 630-5, ~ 1-8(c) (18 Mar. 1977). 
154. Pay Manual, supra note 32 (Change No. 56), at ~ 10301 (1 Jan. 1967). 
155. Graves v. Bednar, 167 Neb. 847, 852, 95 N.W.2d 123, 128 (1959) (court denied 
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enacted to provide. relief under such emergency conditions. IllS 
The suspension of civil remedies against service members is seen 
as a necessary sacrifice on the part of civilians to further na-
tional defense. III? Similarly, the practitioner should be aware of 
national sentiment in anticipating the difficulty in obtaining a 
judgment against the service member. A court's patriotism may 
color a decision of whether the service member is prejudiced be-
cause of military service.llls 
4. Necessity to Appear 
The unavailability of the service member will not necessa-
rily preclude the court from finding the member is not 
prejudiced.11I9 Courts consider the adequacy of discovery tech-
niques to compensate for any detriment he may suffer due to his 
absence. ISO The Army policy on use of discovery makes a finding 
of necessity of the service member's presence less likely. Regula-
tions expressly encourage civilian attorneys to use discovery, 
particularly when a service member's physical appearance in 
court may interfere with his military duties.l6l Further, upon re-
stay and distinguished Davis v. Wyche, 224 N.C. 746, 32 S.E.2d 358 (1944), which per-
mitted a stay, because, in Davis, a "hot war was then in progress"); Parker v. Parker, 207 
Ga. 588, 63 S.E.2d 366 (1951) (court overturned an order for temporary support and 
granted a stay when the service member was overseas engaged in the Korean conflict). 
156. 50 U.S.C. app. § 510 (1976). See note 77 supra. 
157. See Johnson v. Johnson, 59 Cal. App. 2d 375, 139 P.2d 33 (1943) and case 
discussion at note 130 supra. 
158. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 222 Ga. 246, 149 S.E.2d 468 (1966). An action for 
divorce was begun in Georgia while the service member was undergoing training in North 
Carolina in preparation for active duty in Vietnam. The trial court awarded temporary 
alinlony and child support but the appellate court reversed, permitting the service mem-
ber to remain free of obligation until discharged. This harsh result occurred at a time 
when the general population supported American intervention in Vietnam. For an exam-
ple of judicial patriotism, see McGlynn v. McGlynn, 178 Misc. 530, 531, 35 N.Y.S.2d 6, 7 
(1942) and case discussion at note 6 supra. 
159. See note 127 supra and accompanying text. 
160. "AssunIing, arguendo, that defendant did not have ample opportunity to ap-
pear personally in his defense ... we nevertheleSB remain unimpressed with this conten-
tion. Had such a situation prevailed, the defendant might nevertheless have availed him-
self of the usual remedies available in Chancery proceedings, by taking of depositions or 
interrogatories ..•. " Fluhr v. Fluhr, 140 N.J. Eq. 131, 133, 52 A.2d 847, 849 (1947). "At 
no time prior to entry of the decree in the cause did the defendant make. . . any show-
ing that his testimony could not be taken by desposition." Cadieux v. Cadieux, 75 So. 2d 
700, 703 (Fla. S. Ct. 1954). 
161. Army Regs. No. 27-40, ~ 7-17(a) (15 June 1973); 32 C.F.R. § 516.5(g) (1980). 
See Johnson v. Johnson, 59 Cal. App. 2d 375, 381, 139 P.2d 33, 36 (1943) (denial of stay 
affirmed where civilian plaintiff introduced evidence from the service member's com-
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quest, a military legal assistance officer will help the member 
comply with discovery requests.1S2 
The practitioner can make convincing arguments that, in 
the "usual" support proceeding, the service member's presence 
is not indispensable.lss The issues in the support action are nar-
row. They focus only upon the needs of the dependents and the 
respondent's financial ability to meet those needs.l64 These is-
sues can generally be adequately set forth by way of income and 
expense declarations.lslI Indeed, California courts frequently de-
termine the support obligation solely on the basis of information 
contained in the financial declarations filed by both parties.lss 
Depositions and interrogatories can be employed when a dispute 
over the information contained in the declarations arises.ls7 
ID. ENFORCEMENT OF THE SUPPORT JUDGMENT 
Once a support judgment is obtained, the practitioner will 
have relatively little difficulty enforcing it against the service 
member.lss This was not always the case. Until recently, the 
doctrine of soverign immunity precluded garnishing salaries of 
mander that the commander did not refuse to permit the service member to be produced 
as a witness, and had suggested that he would allow time off for the service member to 
have his deposition taken). 
162. See generally Army Regs. No. 608-50 (22 Feb. 1974), and discussion at note 53 
supra. 
163. Indeed, the degree of standari2ation in assessing support obligations can to 
some extent be demonstrated by the use of temporary support schedules by many courts. 
See, e.g., SAN FRANCISCO SUPER. CT. DOM. REL. R. 8. Interestingly, under the San Fran-
cisco support schedule, an unemployed dependent spouse would be entitled to receive 
$250 per month assuming the obligor was a private in the Army, level E-!. A private, at 
level E-l currently earns a total of $609.60 monthly, if he has dependents-$448.80, net 
salary and $160.80 BAQ. See 37 U.S.C. § 1009 (1976). The Army would require that only 
$160.80 be used for support-the BAQ allowance. See note 32 supra and accompanying 
text. 
164. Mattos v. Correia, 274 Cal. App. 2d 413, 79 Cal. Rptr. 229 (1969); BierI v. Mc-
Mahon, 270 Cal. App. 2d 97, 75 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1969); Van Diest v. Van Diest, 266 Cal. 
App. 2d 541, 72 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1968). 
165. See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 1243, 1285.50 (West 1981). . 
166. C. MARKEY, CALIFORNIA FAMIT.Y LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 26.106[3] 
(1980). 
167. If the service member is represented by an attorney, the practitioner can make 
an even stronger argument that the defendant's interests are adequately protected. The 
California Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff service member's ability to prosecute 
was not materially affected by physical absence, where his attorney was already familiar 
with the facts, which were not in dispute. Whealton v. Whealton, 67 Cal. 2d 656, 432 
P.2d 979, 63 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1967). 
168. See discussion at notes 171-186 infra and accompanying text. 
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federal employees.169 In 1975 Congress enacted a law which per-
mits garnishment of federal wages for the limited purpose of en-
forcing child and spousal support proceedings.170 The practi-
tioner, therefore, can either proceed to garnish the service 
member's wages, or attempt to obtain his voluntary compliance, 
with or without the aid of military channels. The following sec-
tion discusses these approaches as well as SSCRA problems 
which may arise in the area of enforcement. 
The practitioner should consider attempting to secure the 
service member's voluntary compliance before pursuing enforce-
ment through other avenues. I'll The dependents may receive 
their financial support more quickly because less time and effort 
is involved than required to obtain a court-ordered garnishment. 
Many service members are complying with support orders vol-
untarily since the enactment of the federal garnishment stat-
ute.I'l2 The risk of military sanctions for violating the Army reg-
ulation that members abide by court orders may provide 
additional incentive to remit.I'lS If the service member remains 
169. Garnishment was considered to place an intolerable burden on the processes of 
public administration and to apply public funds to uses other than those for which they 
were allocated. Romero, Garnishment of Military Wages, 17 A.F.L. REV. 1, 3 (Fall, 
1975). 
170. 42 U.S.C. § 659 (Supp. 1979). The statute provides that: 
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, effective 1 
January 1975, moneys (the entitlement to which is based upon 
remuneration for employment) due from, or payable by, the 
United States ... to any individual, including members of the 
armed services, shall be subject, in like manner and to the 
same extent as if the United States. . . were a private person, 
to legal process brought for the enforcement, against such in-
dividual of his legal obligations to provide child support or 
make alinIony payments. 
The Federal government also permits the Secretary of Treasury to assess and collect 
unpaid support for dependents in the same manner as a delinquent federal tax. 42 
U.S.C. § 652(b) (Supp. III 1979). 
171. Lawyers frequently overlook this alternative. [1978] 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 
2474. 
172. "Based on thousands of phone calls and letters from interested parties, con-
servative estimates indicate that, for every actual garnishment, voluntary compliance re-
sulting solely from threatened garnishment avoids at least one other potential garnish-
ment." Phillips & Dowark, The Federal Garnishment Statute: Its Impact in the Air 
Force, 18 A.F.L. REV. 70, 78 (Winter, 1976). 
173. "The service member will provide support in accordance with the terms of 
court orders until relieved of this obligation by modification of the orders by a court of 
competent jurisdiction." Army Regs. No. 608-99, 11 2-4(c) (15 Nov. 1978). See 32 C.F.R. § 
40.14 (1980). On possible sanctions, see notes 38-45 supra and accompanying text. 
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uncooperative, the practitioner may seek the aid of the com-
manding officer to encourage the satisfaction of the support 
judgment.l'u The commanding officer, however, cannot compel 
payment absent a court-ordered garnishment.l'1l1 
To garnish the service member's wages, the practitioner 
proceeds as if the government were a private employer.l'16 The 
law of the jurisdiction issuing the writ of garnishment governs 
the procedures to be employed, as well as the amount of the ser-
vice member's pay that can be subject to garnishment.l'1'1 The 
writ will be honored by the military unless it contravenes federal 
lawl'1S or the laws of the issuing state.l'19 Once the Army deter-
mines the garnishment request is valid, it notifies the member 
and forwards the amount ordered to the dependents. ISO The 
Army will inform the member that he should resolve any gar-
nishment difficulties through the appropriate civil court. lSI 
174. See notes 27-48 supra and accompanying text. One practitioner suggests, how-
ever, that "if one does not want to wreck the ex-husband's career, it is often better to 
resort to garnishment first, without taking this preliminary step." [1978] 4 FAM. L. REP. 
(BNA) 2474. 
175. See note 25 supra. 
176. 42 U.S.C. § 659 (Supp. ill 1979). The addresses for service of process on each 
branch of the Armed Forces are (1) U.S. Army Commander, U.S. Army Finance & Ac-
counting Center, Attn: FINCL-G, Indianapolis, Ind. 46249; (2) U.S. Air Force, Air Force 
Financing & Accounting Center (AFAFC/AJQ), Denver, Colo. 80279; (3) U.S. Navy, Di-
rector, Navy Family Allowance Activity, Federal Building, Cleveland Ohio 44199; and (4) 
U.S. Marine Corps, Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Finance Center, Kansas City, 
Mo. 64197. [1978] 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3051. See 42 U.S.C. § 659(b) (Supp. ill 1979), 
regarding method of service. 
177. 42 U.S.C. § 659(b) (Supp. ill 1979). Evans v. Evans, 429 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. 
Okla. 1976). 
178. "Unless the order is contrary to Federal law, USAFAC [United States Army 
Finance & Accounting Center] will garnish the member's pay in accordance with the 
court order unless it is modified or rescinded." Army Reg. No. 608-99, 'II 2-5(c) (15 Nov. 
1978). For example, the federal government has set a limit on the percentage of pay that 
can be garnished. 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. ill 1979). The state law on exemptions gov-
erns if it is more restrictive. See Evans v. Evans, 429 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. Okla. 1976). 
179. Army Regs. No. 608-99 (15 Nov. 1978); Overman v. United States, 563 F.2d 
1287 (8th Cir. 1977). 
180. Pay Manual, supra note 32 (Change No. 50), at '1170710(g)(2)(7); see also [1978] 
4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2475, in which Howard M. Bushman, Army Judge Advocate at the 
time garnishment statutes were passed, stated that the Army's interagency board for the 
implementation of garnishment procedures "decided that they could assume that in 99 
percent of the cases the man at sometime had his day in court. Therefore, it was decided 
that every demand should be honored." 
181. "Jurisdictional or procedural challenges to garnishment actions remain the pri-
vate legal resonsibility of the individual service members." Army Regs. No. 608-99, P 2-
5(a) (15 Nov. 1978). One commentator notes that legal assistance officers have been ad-
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The practitioner may be confronted with the SSCRA in 
seeking to enforce the support order against the service member. 
The Act permits the member to stay the execution of a judg-
ment, through garnishment or otherwise, unless his ability to 
comply with the judgment is not significantly hindered because 
of military duties.182 Service members have on occasion argued 
for a stay of support order enforcement because military service 
has substantially affected their ability to comply.18s Courts gen-
erally reject this argument as contrary to public policy. 1M The 
vised not to help the service member resist implementation of the garnishment. [1978] 4 
FAM. L. REp. (BNA) 2475. 
182. 50 U.S.C. app. § 523 (1976) provides in part: 
In any action or proceeding commenced in any court 
against a person in military service, before or during the pe-
riod of such service, or within sixty days thereafter, the court 
may, in its discretion, and its own motion, or on application to 
it by such person or some person on his behalf shall, unless in 
the opinion of the court the ability of the defendant to comply 
with the judgment or order entered or sought is not materially 
affected by reason of his military service-
(a) Stay the execution of any judgment or order entered 
against such person, as provided in this Act; and 
(b) Vacate or stay any attachment or garnishment of 
property, money, or debts in the hands of another, whether 
before or after judgment as provided in this act. 
(Citations omitted.) 
183. See, e.g., McKinney v. McKinney, 182 Misc. 903, 50 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1944) (stay 
granted on portion of arrearages); Elkind v. Elkind, 180 Misc. 329, 41 N.Y.S.2d 820 
(1943) (stay denied of the enforcement or support obligations under a separation agree-
ment); Kelley v. Kelley, 38 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1942) (stay requested in an action to enforce 
support provision; continued to obtain proof of the financial status of the parties); Will-
son v. Willson, 40 Ohio L. Abs. 281 (Dom. ReI. 1944) (denial of stay of judgment subject-
ing service member's property to satisfaction of alimony and support payments); Com-
monwealth v. Watts, 47 Pa. D. & C. 87, 4 Mon. Leg. R. 134, 11 Som. Leg. J. 141, 56 York 
Leg. Rec. (1941) (stay of enforcement of support order denied). 
184. See Kelley v. Kelley, 38 N.Y.S. 344, 349 (1942): 
Clearly, it would be unjust to suspend provision for food and 
clothing for children six and eight years of age for the dura-
tion of the war if the father, receiving his own subsistence 
from the government, has the means so to provide. Moved, as 
we all are with a duty and desire to contribute to the well-
being and morale of those in the armed forces, there is a point 
beyond which moral obligations at home cannot be entirely 
overlooked. 
See also Clarke v. Clarke, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 64 (1941) ("Notwithstanding his military service, 
some provision for defendant's wife and children must be made."); Willson v. Willson, 40 
Ohio L. Abs. 281 (Dom. ReI. 1944) ("The intention of Congress to protect men in service 
did not preclude the enforcement of their necessary civil obligations, and that a defen-
dant who had left for the Army without making provision for the care of his wife and 
child, although he had property in the jurisdiction, was not entitled to the protection of 
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service member may be entitled to a modification of the support 
order if his income has changed substantially since the entry of 
the order, 1811 but a blanket stay is generally unnecessary and 
rarely granted. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The financial abandonment of spouse and child is pervasive 
in this country. Too many offenders have evaded the duty of 
support. The likelihood of recovering support from the delin-
quent obligor appears to be aggravated when he is in the mili-
tary. Statutory protections exist to shield the service member 
from civil suit.18s Nevertheless, the military has made a good 
faith effort to prevent itself from becoming a refuge for those 
seeking to avoid family obligations. As this Comment has indi-
cated, however, only the rarest of circumstances should preclude 
dependents from acquiring support from a member of the 
Armed Forces. 
the statute since he did not question the reasonableness of the support order nor make 
any offer or provision for his family, but apparently intended that the proceedings be 
stayed and his family be left to get along as best they could."); Commonwealth v. Watts, 
47 Pa. D. & C. 87, 88, 4 Mon. Leg. R. 134, 135, 11 Som. Leg. J. 141,56 York Leg. Rec. 61 
(1942) (the SSCRA does not "relieve deserting fathers of the obligation to support their 
children.") . 
185. See, e.g., Clarke v. Clarke, 25 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1941) (service member requested a, 
modification and the court continued the matter to obtain sufficient data on the financial 
situation of the parties before ruling on the motion). On this issue, Army regulations • 
state, 
Many outstanding and uncontested support judgments against 
service members cause severe hardship. Such judgments can 
only be modified by court orders. If the member's outstanding 
income appears inadequate to satisfy an outstanding judgment 
and still maintain the service member, the commander should 
urge the individual to consult a legal assistance officer or other 
counsel. 
Army Reg. No. 608·99, 11 2-4 (15 Nov. 1978). 
186. See note 183 supra. 
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